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ABSTRACT: This paper evaluates the effects of the changes in Burkina Faso’s mineral policies of 2013 and 2015 
and their economic attractiveness using the Natougou Project as case study. Cash flow analyses shows a higher NPV of 
US $93,817,833.84 and an IRR of 44.67% under the 2015 Mining Code. Sensitivity analysis shows  the project was less 
sensitive under the 2003 Mining Code as it takes a 18.25% decrease in the revenue for the project to break even as against 
13.04% under the  2015 Mining Code.  The project was insensitive to changes in operating cost and capital cost under the 
2003 Mining Code but will not be viable if the capital cost and operating cost increase beyond 30% and 32.75% 
respectively for the 2015 Mining Code. An   amount of US $ 321,488,366.61 will accrue to the government for 2015 




Copyright: Copyright © 2018 Agyei et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution License (CCL), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
 
Dates:  Received: 02 June 2018; Revised: 22 July: 2018; Accepted: 26 August 2018 
 
Keywords: Mining Code, investment, physical policies, dividends, sensitivity analysis, government and project. 
 
Burkina Faso, a West African nation, has witnessed an 
exponential mining boom in recent years. The growth 
in mine production is as a results of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) propitiated by the favorable business 
climate created by progressive tax regimes and 
modern mining fiscal policies. Currently the country 
has positioned itself as the fourth largest producer of 
gold after South Africa, Ghana and Mali. The export 
of gold has surpassed traditional exports like livestock 
and agricultural products (Dabire, 2015). Burkina 
Faso exports around 40 metric tons of gold annually.  
Several greenfield gold mining projects have sprang 
up.  Natougou Gold Project is one of the promising 
enterprises. 
 
Location of Natougou Gold Deposit: The Natougou 
Project site fig.1 is situated at about 320 kilometres 
Southwest of Ouagadougou, the capital city of the 
country. The Natougou deposit area is connected to the 
rest of the immediate town by well paved roads linking 
Kantchari through Fada N’Gourma and Diapaga, The 
geographical coordinates are 12°37’0” North and 
1°41’0” East. 
 
Geology of Natougou Gold Deposit: The West African 
Birimian Greenstone belt is predominantly composed 
of lower Protozoic age and sedimentary units with 
intrusions of related plutonic rock formations. The 
Natougou deposit is found within this geological 
formation, specifically in the southern rims of the 
Diapaga Greenstone belt in the Eastern Region of 
Burkina Faso. The concessions reveal greenstone 
formations similar to the Tarkwaian gold belts of 
Ghana and include extensions of Natougou Rock 
Structure. The gold deposit is found in the Natougou 
petrography, an exposed flat laying lithology in the 
South Eastern edge of the country. The structure is 
hosted in amphibole greenstones which form an open 
dome dipping to North West. It is a massive deposit 
composed of high grade flat laying quartz sulphide 
lodes 
 
The mineralogy of the deposit occurs within a flat 
laying shear zone that possess a subtle anticlinal 
geometry and contains mafic to transitional volcanic/ 
intrusive beddings. The gold minerals are hosted in 
silicified shear zone and large portions occur as free 
milling ores. Sulphide encapsulated refractory ores 
like pyrrhotite, pirite and minor asrsenopirite and 
chacopirites are disseminated in the strong shearing, 
sheeted and deformed quartz veins and silified zones. 
However, coarse free milling gold is contained within 
the mineralised zones as well. 
 
The objective of this study was to assess the effects of 
changes in fiscal mineral policies on the viability of 
mineral projects in Burkina Faso. This was achieved 
through the assessment and evaluation of the various 
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fiscal policies governing mining royalties, taxes, and 
allowances within two major mining policy reforms. 
The data generated were then used to carry out cash 
flow and sensitivity analysis using the Natougou 
mining project as a case study. 
 
 
Fig 1: The Location of Natougou Mining Project 
 
General Overview Mineral Policy Reforms in Burkina 
Faso: Proponents of the current mining legislation 
argue it aims to strike a balance between exploitation 
of natural resources and the promotion of economic 
and social development of the country. The scope of 
the Mining Code encompasses prospection, 
exploration, exploitation, processing and marketing of 
the mineral products excluding water and fossil fuels. 
The 2015 Mining Reforms reaffirm the following: (1) 
The mineral deposits contained in the soil and subsoil 
are vested in the state in trust of the people; (2) The 
state shall ensure the development of the resources 
through private initiatives and Foreign Direct 
Investment; (3) Any individual or a legal entity from 
Burkina Faso or a foreign national may carry out a 
mining activity under the Mining Code. However 
foreign entities are not permitted to extract minerals 
directly. Foreign  companies need to incorporate or set 
up a legal entity regulated entirely by the laws of 
Burkina Faso; and (4) A title holder who is not a 
resident may be allowed to operate provided a national 
agent registered by the Administrator of Mines is 
presented. The appointed agent must have a strong 
knowledge of the mining codes of the country   and 
follow registration procedures spelt out by the 
Administration of Mines (Anon, 2015; Wafwana, 
2013). 
 
Taxation has variable effects on various margins of 
resource development (Smith, 2013). Several mineral 
taxation reforms have been introduced. The Code has 
affixed taxes for certain mining activities with their 
corresponding   tax exemptions and incentives for 
different stages of mine development to promote the 
competitiveness of Burkina Faso.  
 
 Article 93 of the Mining Code 2015 limits the 
stabilisation clause to twenty years and the mining 
convention is signed only during the exploitation 
unless renewals are granted.  Holders of permits are 
required to payment of fixed charges proportional to 
the surface area and the mining royalties (Ad 
Valorem). Holders of mining titles are also required to 
pay annual fees dependent on the size of the surface 
area and the expected duration of the mine (Anon, 
2015; Calame 2015).  
 
The current rates for mineral royalties are as follows: 
8% for uranium, 7% for diamonds and gemstones, 
between 3% and 5% for gold and precious metals 
depending on the price in the metal market. During the 
development stage mining companies can enjoy some 
tax benefits like exemption of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) on certain imported goods and services. These 
VAT exceptions can be extended to a maximum of two 
years provided the project targets reaches at least 50% 
of completion. During the development stage, tax 
exemptions are extended to procurement of raw 
materials, fuels, lubricants, vehicles and spare parts.  
The exemptions include community solidarity charges 
and other community development funding related 
charges.  
 
The moratorium on taxes can last for a maximum of 
three years and ends on the first day of the 
commencement of production. When mining reaches 
the exploitation stage the companies are required to 
pay tax on industrial and commercial profits and taxes 
on tangible assets which have been reduced by 
10%.The reduction has been taken care of by the New 
Mining Code (2015) fixing the tax to paid at 27%. The 
2013 Mining Code provided for significant tax 
incentives during exploitation stage such as exemption 
of seven years patent tax, employer and apprentice tax 
and registration fee for certain corporate acts (Anon, 
2009). The 2015 Mining Code changes the old tax and 
customs regime. The review of 2015 has introduced a 
mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility clause in 
form of taxation.  
  
Taxation is an attribute of sovereignty and a conduit 
for national development, however it has strengths and 
limitations for the development of sustainable mining.  
A community development fund which takes 1% of 
the turnover after exploitation of minerals is a new 
feature of the 2015 Mine Code and this particular tax 
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underscores the aspirations of host communities to 
reap the benefits of mineral resources. The state shall 
in turn transfer 25% of the royalties to the Community 
Development Fund. However, the modality for the 
disbursement of the fund is not well defined. Tilton 
(2004) questions the real social impact of such funds 
in the resource-rich communities because the impact 
of such revenues in the host communities is sometimes 
debatable. For example, mining companies in Ghana 
have voluntarily pledged to contribute one dollar per 
every ounce of gold to the various Community 
Development Funds in the communities. However, in 
most instances these resources have not yielded the 
expected results due to misapplication and 
misappropriation of these resources by corrupt 
traditional leaders, local government officials and 
community leaders of the mining districts. This has 
contributed to avoidable strained relations between 
belligerent communities and the mining companies in 
Ghana. Giving the Burkinabe mineral endowments, 
the success of the Community Development Tax has 
the potential of spiraling harmful tax competition on 
the continent.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
When a company is confronted with several 
investment alternatives, it becomes necessary to 
evaluate the economic attractiveness of each 
alternative and accept or reject it. Any evaluation 
criterion should provide a company’s management 
with a means of distinguishing between acceptable 
projects in a consistent manner. In addition, it is 
desirable for the evaluation criterion to provide a 
ranking of the acceptable investment alternatives in 
order of their desirability to assist in selecting the 
alternative with the best economic potential. Any 
investment decision method must respect these two 
basic principle (Barra, 2015; Laporte and 
Quatrebarbes, 2015). Bigger benefits are preferable to 
smaller benefits; and early benefits are preferable to 
later benefits. There are several criteria for evaluating 
the economic attractiveness of an investment proposal 
with the most widely used in the mining industry being 
Net Present Value (NPV); Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR); and Discounted Pay Back Period (DPBP) 
(Dacoure, 2016; Eshun, 2016).  
 
The Net Present Value is defined as the sum of the 
present value or worth of all incomes minus the sum 
of the present value or worth of all after tax 
expenditures calculated at the minimum rate of return 
(i). It may be expressed mathematically as in Equation 
(1) 
 
NPV = ∑PV of cash inflow @ i - ∑PV of cash 
outflows @ i                                                      (1) 
If a projects NPV is positive (NPV ˃ 0), the project is 
considered to be economically acceptable. When the 
NPV is zero (NPV = 0), the project breaks even. When 
the NPV is negative (NPV ˂ 0), the project is 
considered to be economically unacceptable (Dacoure, 
2016).  
 
The NPV criterion has the following characteristics 
which makes it suitable as an evaluation criterion:  
1) It takes into account the time value of money 
by specifying the interest rate in the calculation;  
2) It provides a single number of  cash 
equivalent, which can be used as an index for 
comparison at a specific point in time (t = 0); and  
3) The NPV value is always a unique quantity 
for a given interest rate.  
  Internal Rate of Return is defined as the interest rate 
at which the NPV of a project is equal to zero. 
Mathematically, this may be expressed as follows in 
Equations (2) and (3):  
 
IRR = i for ∑PV of cash inflow @ i = ∑PV of cash 
outflows @ i                                                           (2) 
 
IRR = I for NPV @ I = 0                                        (3) 
 
If a projects IRR is greater than the minimum rate of 
return (IRR ˃ i), the project is considered to be 
economically acceptable. When the IRR is equal to the 
minimum rate of return (IRR = i), the project breaks 
even. When the IRR is greater than the minimum rate 
of return (IRR ˂ i), the project is considered to be 
economically unacceptable.  
 
 Discounted Pay Back Period (DPBP) is defined as the 
time (number of years) required for the net cash flow 
from a project to pay back the initial investment taking 
into consideration the time value of money.  
 
If the DPBP is less than some minimum value 
acceptable to the company, the project is considered to 
be acceptable. The shorter the DPBP, the more 
acceptable the project becomes.   
 
 According to (Gentry and O’Neil, 1984), the cash 
flow of any business may be defined as the difference 
between the total cash receipts (inflows) and the total 
cash disbursements (outflows) for a given period of 
time, typically one year. Mathematically, this can be 
expressed as in Equation (4):  
 
 Cash Flow = ∑ cash inflows - ∑ cash outflows     (4)  
 
The annual gross revenue from a satisfactory mining 
project must normally be sufficient to pay operating 
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costs and other deferred tax deductions such as loss 
carry forward deductions before paying income tax 
with the resulting after tax revenue being the 
company’s net profit for the year. Normally, only the 
operating cost, interest on loan and various income tax 
expenditures are the actual corporate disbursements 
during the year.  
 
Sensitivity analysis of a mineral project refers to the 
investigation of the effect of changes in the project’s 
economic parameters on the economic viability of the 
project.  Sensitivity analysis is a way to predict the 
outcome of a decision if a situation turns out to be 
different compared to the key prediction(s). It is 
required because the project’s economic parameters 
such as the capital cost, operating cost and revenue, 
used in the economic evaluation of the project are only 
estimates (Gentry and O’Neil, 1984). Now, every 
estimated value has some degree of error associated 
with it and therefore may not be the real value. Again, 
by the time a mining project is being commissioned, 
all estimated values of the economic parameters may 
have changed, therefore the need to determine the 
magnitude of change in the economic parameters that 
the project can absorb and remain attractive to 
investors (Tchikaya, 2016). There are three ways by 
which sensitivity analysis can be done, namely the 
single variable sensitivity analysis; the range approach 
to sensitivity analysis and the probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis. Of these, the single variable sensitivity 
analysis is mostly used in the economic evaluation of 
mineral projects. The study considered two fiscal 
policy regimes: the 2003 Mining Code issued on the 
8th of May 2003 and the new 2015 Mining Code 
signed by the President of Burkina Faso on the 16th 
July, 2015. The prominent fiscal policies within the 
two regimes that are applicable to the economic 
evaluation of the mineral projects in Burkina Faso are 
summarised  in Table1. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the main Fiscal Parameters used in the Economic Evaluation of Mineral Projects under the two Fiscal Policy 
Regimes. 
   2003 Mining Code  2015 Mining Code (New)  
Royalty            
(Ad Valorem)  
3% when ounce of gold price is less than 1000$  
4% when it is between 1000$ - 1300$   5% when 
above 1300$   
3% when ounce of gold price is less than 1000$   
4% when it is between 1000$ - 1300$    5% when 
above 1300$   
Surface fees   
From US$5 to US$40,000 per square kilometers per 
year depending on the  
type of metals    
 From US$5 to US$40,000 per square kilometers 
per year depending on the  
type of metals    
 Local  
Community  
Development Fund  
 ----   1% of monthly turnover  
Corporate Income Tax  17.50%  27.50%  
Tax on dividends  6.25%  12.50%  
Value Added Tax   18%  18%  
State Participation  10% free equity  10% + possible additional equity   
Capital Allowance Accelerated (declining balance method) Accelerated (declining balance method) 
 
 
Basic Assumptions and Principles: The project cost 
estimation was done to make available realistic cost 
values that served as a stepping stone for the 
evaluation of the economic potential of the Natougou 
project.  
 
The following assumptions and principles were used 
for the estimation process: (i) Contingency allowance 
of 15% was assumed to take care of all unforeseen cost 
elements within the defined scope of the project; (ii) 
No allowances were made to cater for escalation in the 
estimates; (iii) The yearly production of 1 340 000 t 
was assumed to be constant each year; (iv) The surface 
tax for this particular project averaged 13 500 
$/km2/yr; (v) The 1% of the monthly turnover 
estimated to be paid to the Local Community 
Development; (vi) Fund by mining companies was 
assumed to be paid every year at the same flat rate of 
1%; (vii) The gold price used in the analysis will be 
the same each year leading to the same annual gross 
revenue; and (viii). The Marginal Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital is estimated to be 20%. 
Please note that all cost estimates were made in US 
dollars as the local cost components were changed 
from CFA Francs to US dollars with an exchange rate 
of US$ 1 being equivalent to 614.8 CFA. 
 
Please note that all cost estimates were made in US 
dollars as the local cost components were changed 
from CFA Francs to US dollars with an exchange rate 
of US$ 1 being equivalent to 614.8 CFA. 
 
 Capital Cost Estimates: In order to make a very sound 
investment decision, current equipment prices and 
construction cost of facilities were obtained from 
manufacturers, contractors and through comparison 
with existing mines. Burkina Faso being a landlocked 
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country, an additional 15% of purchase cost was added 
to the purchase cost of all equipment that would be 
purchased outside Burkina Faso to take care of 
shipping and any other unforeseen cost. The capital 
costs were grouped under four categories. The 
estimated total capital cost in US Dollars (US$) was 
219 600 000.00 
 
Estimation of Operating Cost: Some assumptions 
were made when estimating the operating cost of the 
project. The assumptions include: (i) Both skilled and 
unskilled labour will be sourced from Burkina Faso 
and where training is required, the company will 
ensure that it is given to suitable candidates; and (ii) 
The use of expatriates will be limited to top 
management staff.  
 
The operating cost of the Natougou project was based 
on a working regime of 12 hours per shift, 2 shifts per 
day and 335 working days per year leading to an 
annual production of 1 340 000 t  of ore. Considering 
an average stripping ratio of 7.1, it means that 18 224 
000 t of waste would be mined annually and sent to the 
waste dumps. The mine will employ drilling and 
blasting as the main methods though some amount of 
ripping will be done. The operating costs have been 
categorised into mining, processing and overheads. 
Table 2 presents a detailed operating cost of the 
project.  
 
   Table 2: Estimates of Average Operating Costs Obtained from 
Vendors 
Cost Centre  Estimate (US$)  
Pre-Production Costs     
Acquisition, Exploration and Consultation  8 228 841.50 
Subtotal  8 228 841.50 
Direct Capital Cost  
Mining (Ore and Waste)  
 
 
CAT D10T  Dozer × 5;  4 161 316.12 
CAT 14G Grader × 4;  2 301 851.61 
CAT 988F FEL × 4;  2 813 374.19 
Leibherr 984 Excavator × 8;  7 661 249.51 
CAT 777D Dump Truck × 30;  37 145 983.82 
Drill Machine × 8;  9 207 406.44 
Explosive Truck × 1;  230 185.16 
Water Truck × 1; and  962 448.38 
Mine Vehicle × 35  3 516 717.74 
Haul Roads  2 557 612.90 
Engineering (10%)  7 055 814.59 
Subtotal  77 613 960.47 
Processing Plant Services   
Carbon In Leach Tank×4  5 502 319.58 
Stripping and Electro wining  81 176.41 
Carbon Regeneration Kiln  51 152.26 
Smelting Furnace  54 348 141.86 
Tailings Dam  3 341 481.29 
Engineering (10%)  6 332 427.14 
 
Estimation of Project Revenue:  In estimating the 
annual revenue of the project a gold price of 
US$1100.00/oz (US$ 35.3658/g) was used. The 
annual mine revenue is estimated using Equation (5)  
 
 = () [1 +  − ] () () ()                                   (5)  
 
where; T, tonnage of ore produced per year (t/yr.) = 1 
340 000 t/yr; G, mill head grade (g/t) = 3.32 g/t; R, 
mill recovery = 0.929; L, ore loss = 0.05; D, ore 
dilution = 0.20; P, unit price of gold (US$/g); = US$ 
1,100.00/oz. (US$ 35.36/g); R = 1 340 000 (1+0.20-
0.05) (3.32) (0.929) (35.36); R= US $ 168 061 676.97   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Evaluation of the Economic Viability of the Natougou 
Project under two Fiscal Policy Regimes:  
The following estimates and basic assumptions were 
used in the economic evaluation of the Natougou 
Project: (i) Total capital investment  = $ 219 600 000 
(ii)  Annual operating cost  = $ 59 938 200 /yr. (iii) 
Annual production = 340 000 t/yr. (iv) Gold price = $ 
35.36 /g (v) Mill head grade = 3.32 g/t ( vi) Recovery 
= 0.93 (vii) Ore dilution = 20% (viii) Ore loss = 5% 
(viii) Project life = 08 yrs. (ix) Interest on loan capital  
= 15% (x) Discount rate = 20% (xi) Capital structure 
= 50% equity and 50% loan (xii) Working capital = 
25% of annual operating cost 
 
 Economic Evaluation of the Natougou Project under 
the 2003 Mining Code: Table 3 shows the result of the 
cash flow analysis of the Natougou Project under the 
2003 Mining Code. Since the NPV of US $ 93 817 
833.84 is greater than zero and the IRR of 44.67% is 
greater than the minimum rate of return of 20%, the 
Natougou Project is declared to be economically 
viable under the 2003 Mining Fiscal Policy Regime. 
 
Table 3: Cash Flow Analysis under the 2003 Mining Code 
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Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 present the sensitivity analysis of the 
Natougou Project under the 2003 Mining Code which 
has been conducted by varying the capital cost, 
operating cost and revenue within a range of ± 40%. 
The result of the analysis clearly demonstrates that the 
Natougou Project is not sensitive to the variation of 
capital cost and that of operating cost within the range 
of ± 40%.  
 
However, when the revenue decreases beyond 
18.35%, the Natougou project will no longer be 
economically viable.  
 
 
Fig. 2: NPV vs. Variation of Revenue, Capital Cost and Operating 
Cost (2003 Code) 
 
Fig. 3 IRR vs. Variation of Revenue, Capital Cost and Operating 
Cost (2003 Code) 
 
Economic Evaluation of the Natougou Project under 
the New 2015 Mining Code: Table 4 presents the result 
of the cash flow analysis of the Natougou Project 
under the New 2015 Mining Code. Since the NPV of 
US $ 58 072 836.55 is greater than zero and the IRR 
of 35.72% is greater than the minimum rate of return 
of 20%, the Natougou Project is declared to be 
economically viable under the 2015 Mining Fiscal 
Policy Regime. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present the sensitivity 
analysis under the New Mining Code conducted by 
varying the revenue, operating cost and capital cost 
within a range of ± 40%. The result indicates that the 
Natougou Project is sensitive to all the economic 
parameters taken into consideration. In fact, the 
Natougou Project will cease to be viable if the revenue 
decreases beyond 13.04% or if both operating cost and 
capital cost increase beyond 32.75% and 30% 
respectively with the variation of ± 40%. 
  
Table 4: Cash Flow Analysis under the New 2015 Mining Code 
 
 
Comparative Analysis: (Laportes and Quatrebarbes, 
2015; Laporte et al., 2017) highlight the heterogeneity 
of mineral fiscal policies in Africa and gives insights 
about the impacts on investment.  Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 
show the results of the cash flow analysis of the 
Natougou Project under the policy regimes under 
consideration. It can be observed that the Natougou 
Project is more attractive under the 2003 Mining Code 
as the obtained NPV and IRR from the cash flow under 
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the 2003 regime were respectively greater than the 
NPV and IRR obtained under the 2015 regime. 
 
Moreover, the percentage fall in NPV is 38.10% and 
represents an amount of   US $35 744 997.29 while the 
percentage fall in IRR is of 8.95%.  
 
 
Fig. 4: NPV vs. Variation of Revenue, Capital Cost and Operating 
Cost (2015 Code) 
 
 
Fig. 5: IRR vs. Variation of Revenue, Capital Cost and Operating 
Cost (2015 Code) 
 
Conclusion: The paper demonstrates the effectiveness 
of the Burkina Faso’s Revised Mine Code of 2015 and 
the applicability of the 2013 Mining Code. It 
demonstrates the extent to which the country can 
potentially mobilise internal revenue as well as 
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